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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND 
THE BORDER PATROL: APPLYING THE 
“PRIMARY PURPOSE” TEST TO 
MULTIFUNCTION AGENCIES 
CALEB MASON* & JESSICA BERCH** 
The right of criminal defendants to confront the witnesses against 
them is one of our most cherished constitutional protections.  Yet the 
meaning and scope of the right have never been clearly defined by the 
Supreme Court.  In 2004, the Court rejected earlier interpretations of the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as vague and uncertain.  It 
unmoored the constitutional question from the hearsay exceptions and 
replaced the old test with a new one, which has turned out to be quite clear 
in some areas, but maddeningly uncertain in others: A statement will be 
excluded if it is “testimonial.”  In later cases, the Court explained that a 
statement is testimonial if its “primary purpose” is to assist in gathering 
facts for use in a future criminal prosecution. 
The primary purpose test for determining whether interactions 
between government agents and hearsay declarants are testimonial has 
caused confusion for courts, commentators, and law enforcement 
officers—not to mention provoking perhaps the nastiest dissent in recent 
memory.1  Just last year, in 2012, the Supreme Court once again attempted 
to clarify primary purpose, but only managed to further confuse the 
doctrine when the Justices’ opinions split 4–1–4. 
In this Article, we propose a method for applying the primary 
purpose test in a law-enforcement context that increasingly includes 
multifunction agencies whose duties may be only tangentially connected 
to the investigation and prosecution of crime.  We propose that the 
primary purpose of an interaction should be determined, in part, by a 
statistical evaluation of the relative likelihood of criminal prosecution 
among the various possible outcomes of a particular category of agent-
 
* Caleb Mason, Associate, Miller Barondess, L.L.P.   
** Jessica Berch, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.   
1. In dissent in Michigan v. Bryant, Justice Scalia critically questioned the Court’s 
decision “to resurrect [the pre-Crawford landscape] by a thousand unprincipled distinctions” 
without explicitly overruling Crawford.  131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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witness interactions.  We then demonstrate how this approach would 
apply in several situations, particularly those involving the United States 
Border Patrol—the epitome of a modern multifunction agency with 
mixed civil and criminal enforcement duties. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A United States Border Patrol agent on routine duty encounters two 
people walking in the desert near the border.  He approaches and 
commands them to stop.  The agent then separates the two individuals 
and asks the first one, “Where are you two from?”  Person 1 (P-1) 
answers, implicating himself and his co-walker, P-2, as being in the 
country illegally.  P-2 is later charged with a crime, such as illegal 
reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.  If P-1 is unavailable at trial, is his answer 
to the agent’s question admissible against P-2 under the Confrontation 
Clause? 
This is not an idle hypothetical: Immigration-related crimes are the 
most commonly charged federal crimes, and establishing the nationality 
and identity of people encountered by the Border Patrol is a critical part 
of the government’s case.2  Putting aside any objections on hearsay or 
other grounds under the Federal Rules of Evidence, one must ask the 
question: Does the Constitution permit the prosecution to offer such 
statements in evidence at trial through the testimony of the agent? 
The framework we propose in this Article for answering this 
question will provide a meaningful template for determining whether 
the Confrontation Clause bars such statements.  The “primary purpose” 
test for “testimonial” statements, and the application of that test to 
these informal interactions, is likely to become increasingly significant as 
the lines between national security, civil regulation, criminal 
prosecution, and law enforcement continue to blur.3 
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Michigan v. Bryant4 provided 
 
2. See infra Part III for discussion of cases in which this situation arises.  For discussion 
of recent federal charging trends, see Caleb E. Mason & Scott M. Lesowitz, A Rational Post-
Booker Proposal for Reform of Federal Sentencing Enhancements for Prior Convictions, 31 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 339, 340 n.1 (2011). 
3. As mentioned in Part III.B.4, infra, various other agencies, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), also have multiple 
functions and may not always be principally concerned with ferreting out and prosecuting 
crimes. 
4. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).  But see Williams v. Illinois, 132 
S. Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012) (a fractured 4–1–4 Confrontation Clause decision without a majority 
of Justices agreeing on what primary purpose means).  The Williams four-Justice plurality 
requires that the primary purpose relate to the accusation of a particular targeted individual.  
132 S. Ct. at 2242.  The four-Justice dissent’s approach directs attention to evidence 
potentially useful in a criminal prosecution.  Id. at 2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  In an opinion 
concurring in the judgment only, Justice Thomas decries any version of the primary purpose 
test.  Id. at 2261–62 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  In a case where the statement 
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some needed clarification of the enigmatic opinions in Davis5 
(precluding statements with a primary purpose of criminal investigation) 
and Crawford6 (precluding testimonial statements)  It also provided 
clues as to how the Court may apply the Confrontation Clause in the 
broader context of multifunction agencies that have missions that 
include, but are not limited to, investigating crime. 
This Article suggests a general approach to analyzing Confrontation 
Clause claims that arise with respect to multifunction agencies, such as 
the Border Patrol.  We propose that to decide the primary purpose of a 
given interaction, courts should consider statistical data and agency 
policies to determine the relative probability of criminal prosecution.7  
That is, determining whether an interaction has a primary purpose of 
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution should be informed by the 
statistical likelihood (the frequency) of a criminal prosecution resulting 
from that type of interaction. 
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Before Crawford: Confrontation Rights as Hearsay Rights 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, in 
criminal cases, the accused has the right to confront the witnesses 
against him.8  For most of its history, the Clause was read as largely 
coextensive with the hearsay rules, so it provided little independent 
authority for precluding evidence.9  As hearsay law grew more nuanced 
and sprouted more legislatively created exceptions following the 
 
relates to a previously identified suspect, the primary purpose doctrine will be satisfied 
regardless of which of the two tests is adopted. 
5. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  In Davis, the eight-member majority 
adopted the primary purpose test in the following passage: “[Statements] are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate . . . that the primary purpose . . . is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Id. at 822. 
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
7. Current law looks at the primary purpose of the interaction from both the officer’s 
and the declarant’s perspective.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160; see also infra notes 58–59 and 
accompanying text.  But see Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 266, 274 n.76 (2012) (“The 
Justices also have not resolved the question of whose primary purpose matters, thereby 
further fracturing the primary purpose test.”).  The test proposed by this Article may either 
supplement or supplant that inquiry. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
9. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
155–56 (1970). 
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adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,10 the Supreme Court 
began to separate the right of confrontation under the Constitution from 
the reliability question addressed by many exceptions to the hearsay 
rules. 
Before that separation began, in Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court 
developed a test for evaluating the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements against criminal defendants.11  First, the declarant must be 
unavailable.12  Next, if the declarant is unavailable, the out-of-court 
statement offered against the defendant must have adequate “indicia of 
reliability.”13  A statement has adequate “indicia of reliability” if it falls 
into a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or bears other “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”14  Hearsay questions, including 
confrontation claims, thus were resolved by asking whether the 
challenged testimony fit into a long-established hearsay category or was 
otherwise trustworthy.15 
B. The New Doctrine: Crawford 
In 2004, Crawford v. Washington changed all that.16  In that case, the 
Supreme Court wrestled with whether the Confrontation Clause 
allowed the use of hearsay statements admitted under the exception for 
statements against penal interest.17 
In Crawford, a husband and wife were alleged to have participated 
in an assault.18  They were arrested, Mirandized, and interrogated 
 
10. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (describing hearsay and its 
exceptions as “an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by 
cubists, futurists and surrealists” (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, 
Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937))). 
11. Id. at 65–66. 
12. Id. at 65. 
13. Id. at 65–66. 
14. Id. at 66.  The Court noted as follows:  
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.  Even 
then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability[.]”  
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at 
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 
Id.  
15. Id.  
16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
17. Id. at 38, 42. 
18. Id. at 38. 
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separately.19  The wife made statements incriminating her husband in the 
assault, and she admitted that she had led her husband to the victim’s 
apartment and told him that the victim had previously assaulted her.20  
Because of state marital privilege rules, the prosecution could not call 
her to testify at her husband’s criminal trial for assault, so instead the 
prosecution sought to admit her statement as a statement against penal 
interest on the grounds that she had admitted to “facilitat[ing] the 
assault.”21  The state courts went back and forth analyzing the answer to 
the Confrontation Clause question (namely, the reliability of the 
statement), ultimately admitting the statement.22 
In a sweeping opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the entire 
Roberts framework.23  The Court held that the Confrontation Clause has 
nothing to do with reliability, or with rootedness or hearsay exceptions.24  
The Confrontation Clause analysis does not simply incorporate the most 
reliable hearsay exceptions.25  Instead, the Court determined that the 
Clause provides a categorical rule excluding all, and only, “testimonial” 
hearsay.26  Out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” are barred 
even if they fit into a firmly rooted hearsay exception; conversely, 
 
19. Id. at 38–39. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 40. 
22. Id. at 40–42 (summarizing procedural history).  
23. Id. at 61, 63–68; see also, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232 (2012) (“[I]n 
Crawford, the Court adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation 
right . . . .”). 
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–61, 68–69. 
25. Id. at 60. 
26. Id. at 53, 68–69.  According to the Court, the term testimonial covers, at a minimum, 
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to 
police interrogations.”  Id. at 68.  The Court also took note of other formulations and 
definitions of the term “testimonial,” but declined, for purposes of the Crawford decision, to 
expand the term beyond the situations set forth above.  See id. at 51–52.  The Court continued 
to note, 
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to 
be used prosecutorially[;] extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions[;] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial . . . .  These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define 
the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. 
Id. (ellipses in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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statements that are not “testimonial” pose no Confrontation Clause 
problem, irrespective of their admissibility or inadmissibility as 
hearsay.27  Thus, the question posed in the Border Patrol agent 
hypothetical becomes whether the elicited statement is “testimonial” 
within the meaning of Crawford and its progeny. 
The historical and etymological basis for the majority’s analysis in 
Crawford has been severely criticized,28 and the Court itself has 
acknowledged that the decision has probably lessened the reliability of 
admissible hearsay in criminal cases.29  But the basic doctrine is likely 
here to stay.  It has not, however, simplified Confrontation Clause 
analysis; rather, it has created a new analytical problem for the use of 
hearsay in criminal cases: What exactly does “testimonial” mean? 
The Court did not precisely define the term in Crawford, but did 
provide some guidance.30  “Testimonial” statements can be divided into 
two general categories, one easy to apply and one more difficult.  The 
easy category encompasses trial testimony, affidavits, and depositions: 
formal statements made and memorialized in actual litigation.  The 
Court clarified the law as to the “easy” category in Melendez-Diaz and 
 
27. Id. at 68–69. 
28. For example, Justice Scalia’s definition of “witness” is actually the fifth of five 
definitions in the 1828 edition of Webster’s, as Professor Jonakait explains: 
Webster did not just give one definition, as Crawford implied, but five for the noun 
“witness.”  Crawford selected the last of those meanings as the one incorporated 
into the Confrontation Clause.  It states, “One who gives testimony; as, the witnesses 
in court agreed in all essential facts.”  Crawford, however, simply ignored Webster’s 
third definition of the noun “witness,” which states, “A person who knows or sees 
any thing; one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness.”  This 
meaning links with Webster’s first definition of a “witness” as a transitive verb: “To 
see or know by personal experience.  I witnessed the ceremonies in New York, with 
which the ratification of the constitution was celebrated, in 1788.” 
Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, 
Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 159 (2006) (emphases in 
original) (citations omitted). 
29. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“[W]hatever improvement in 
reliability Crawford produced [in that respect] must be considered together with Crawford’s 
elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-
court nontestimonial statements. . . .  Under Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no 
application to such statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia 
of reliability.”).  In Williams, the four-Justice plurality found the DNA report nontestimonial, 
but, nonetheless, went out of its way to establish the reliability of the report.  Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228, 2238–40 (2012). 
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (defining testimonial). 
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Bullcoming.31  For example, in Melendez-Diaz, the Court determined 
whether state laws permitting hearsay introduction of forensic reports 
on drug analysis (without the live trial testimony of the chemists) were 
permissible under the Confrontation Clause.32  As the majority noted, 
Melendez-Diaz is an easy case once you accept that the Court meant 
what it said in Crawford.33  The forensic reports—formal statements 
made in preparation for trial—were the very epitome of testimonial 
evidence.34  If a government chemist, at the request of prosecutors, 
prepares an affidavit stating that a substance is cocaine then, during the 
criminal trial, the prosecution must call that chemist.  The use of state 
hearsay exceptions to permit introduction of such affidavits in criminal 
cases is unconstitutional.35 
Formal statements or affidavits present the straightforward case, of 
course.36  More difficult calls may emerge from the informal verbal 
interactions between potential witnesses and government actors.  To 
provide guidance, the Court in Crawford offered “various formulations” 
of the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.”37  One, which was 
proposed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL), appeared to cover most, if not all, police–witness 
interactions: “[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later [criminal] trial.”38  The Court 
explained that the definition was set forth merely as one of several 
proposed formulations, and that the Court did not need in that case to 
announce a definition of “testimonial” because the post-arrest 
interrogations present in Crawford “are testimonial under even a 
 
31. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009). 
32. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307, 310–11. 
33. Id. at 310–11. 
34. Id. at 307, 310. 
35. Id. at 329; see also Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (holding that a blood alcohol 
analysis report was testimonial). 
36. Or perhaps not so easy.  As discussed in more detail infra Part II.C.3, the Supreme 
Court recently struggled with the admissibility of an expert’s reliance on a DNA profile 
report in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
37. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
38. Id. at 52 (citing Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 
21754961, at *3). 
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narrow standard.”39  Nonetheless, a number of courts, perhaps frustrated 
by the lack of a definition, have used versions of the NACDL 
formula40—including the Supreme Court itself in its Melendez-Diaz 
analysis.41 
C. The Primary Purpose Test: Davis, Bryant, and Williams 
The boundaries of the difficult category—informal interactions 
between government agents and witnesses—have not been precisely 
drawn.  Instead, in Davis, the Court enunciated the primary purpose test 
for determining when such evidence is “testimonial.”42  The test asks 
whether the primary purpose of the interaction in which the statement 
was made can reasonably be described as being “to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”43 
1. Davis v. Washington 
Davis and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, presented the 
Court with two variations of witness statements, both from victims in 
domestic violence cases.44  In Davis, the statement was the victim’s 
recorded 911 call.45  In response to questions from the operator, she 
described the contemporaneous behavior of the defendant, in the 
present tense, as she was observing it.46  In Hammon, the police arrived 
at the house in response to a domestic violence call, determined that no 
one was hurt and no violence was ongoing, and then separated the 
victim and the defendant and asked the victim what had happened.47 
The Court held that the 911 call was not testimonial, but the on-
 
39. Id.  
40. See J.P. Schnapper–Casteras & David Ellis, The Trouble with Testimoniality: 
Subjective-Objective Ambiguity and Other Problems with Crawford’s Third Formulation, 47 
CRIM. L. BULL. 1186, 1195–96 (2011) (citing United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1303 
(10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 201 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537, 543 (1st Cir. 
2007); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hinton, 423 
F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Foerster, 65 M.J. 120, 123 (C.A.A.F. 2007)). 
41. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009). 
42. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 817–21. 
45. Id. at 817–18. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 819–21 (citing Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446–47 (Ind. 2005)). 
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scene post-emergency interview was.48  In reaching its conclusions, the 
Court finally announced a definition, of sorts, of “testimonial”: 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all 
conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in 
response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or 
nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as 
follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are 
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that 
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.49 
Thus, the inquiry focuses on the primary purpose of the interview.50  
If the primary purpose is to assist with the response to an ongoing 
emergency, the statement is nontestimonial.51  But if the primary 
purpose is to establish facts for a criminal investigation or prosecution, 
the statement is testimonial.52  Because, in Hammon, the officers 
questioned the victim after they had secured the premises and separated 
the suspect and the victim,53 her responses were “testimonial.”54  On the 
other hand, in Davis, because the 911 call was made during the crisis as 
part of the victim’s present observation and narration of the suspect’s 
actions (“He’s here jumpin’ on me again,” etc.), her statements were not 
“testimonial.”55  In sum, a statement made to a 911 operator by a 
declarant reporting an ongoing emergency is not testimonial (the Davis 
facts),56 while the same statement made a few minutes later to 
investigating officers arriving at the scene “after the events described 
were over” is testimonial (the Hammon facts).57 
 
48. Id. at 822. 
49. Id. (emphases added). 
50. The question of whose perspective on that purpose controls was left open and finally 
was answered in Bryant.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011); see infra notes 58–
59 and accompanying text.   
51. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.  
52. Id. at 830.  
53. Id. at 820.  
54. Id. at 830–31. 
55. Id. at 817, 827–28. 
56. Id.  
57. Id. at 830–31. 
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The Davis opinion left uncertain whether the primary purpose 
should be viewed from the perspective of the declarant or from that of 
the interrogating police officer.  The distinction drawn by the Court—
between responding to an ongoing emergency and developing facts for 
prosecution—seems to view the question from the officer’s perspective.58  
Bryant put the uncertainty to rest by holding that courts must consider 
both perspectives.59 
But the question of perspective was not the most serious difficulty 
with the application of the Davis primary purpose test.  That difficulty 
runs deeper, and was anticipated by Justice Thomas: Even in the 
clearest fact pattern, such as beat cops responding to a 911 call of 
domestic violence currently in progress, there are often several purposes 
to the officers’ questions and interactions with witnesses.60  As Justice 
Thomas noted, it will be difficult to create rules that courts can follow to 
non-arbitrarily assign primacy of purpose in many regularly occurring 
law enforcement scenarios.61 
2. Michigan v. Bryant 
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Michigan v. Bryant further 
clarified the primary purpose doctrine.62  In Bryant, the police responded 
to a report that a man had been shot.63  They found the victim bleeding 
on the ground next to his car at a gas station.64  They asked him “what 
had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred.”65  The conversation lasted “5 to 10 minutes,” until paramedics 
arrived.66  The victim later died at the hospital.67  The Court had to 
 
58. Id. at 822. 
59. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“[T]he statements and actions of 
both the declarant and interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the 
interrogation.”).  Justice Scalia, in dissent, said that only the declarant’s perspective should 
matter.  Id. at 1168–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Because Justice Scalia authored Davis, perhaps 
he should have been clearer, or tried to create consensus, about whose perspective matters 
when he wrote that opinion.  Had he done so, much of the confusion about the meaning of 
Davis’s primary purpose test could have been averted.   
60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
part). 
61. Id. at 838 (complaining that the majority’s primary purpose test “yields no 
predictable results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”). 
62. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143. 
63. Id. at 1150. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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articulate the proper constitutional characterization of what the police 
were doing when they questioned the victim: Were they developing facts 
for a future prosecution, or were they responding to an ongoing 
emergency?68  If the former, admission of the statements would violate 
the Confrontation Clause; if the latter, such admission would not violate 
the Clause.   
The Supreme Court held that the police were responding to an 
ongoing emergency because the shooter was still at large, and his 
identity and location were unknown.69  Thus, the fact that the assault was 
not ongoing was not dispositive.70  An obvious import of Bryant’s 
holding, then, is that “emergency response” is a fairly capacious 
concept, and may extend beyond the actual commission of the crime.71 
But, importantly, for the sake of future application of this doctrine, 
the Court also finally provided a fairly clear framework for analyzing 
these recurring fact patterns.  First, the Court clarified the problem of 
perspective: Courts must look from both the declarant’s and 
interrogator’s perspectives.72  Second, the Court clarified that the test is 
objective, not subjective: The actual intentions of the participants are 
not dispositive.  Instead, they are relevant only insofar as they may 
inform the court’s analysis of how an objective, reasonable observer 
would interpret the interaction.73 
Finally, the Court recognized (for the first time explicitly in these 
cases) the possibility of several coexisting purposes in addition to 
“emergency response” and “criminal investigation”: 
But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing 
emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary 
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.  
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1162, 1165.  Perhaps portions of the conversation were for the former purpose, 
and others for the latter.  But the Court did not so granularly dissect the conversation. 
69. Id. at 1164–67. 
70. Id. at 1160–65. 
71. Id. at 1158.  The plurality takes this to an extreme in Williams because even a delay 
of nine-to-thirteen months may still be part of the ongoing emergency of identifying a suspect.  
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2274 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The police did 
not send the swabs to Cellmark until November 2008—nine months after L.J.’s rape—and did 
not receive the results for another four months.  That is hardly the typical emergency 
response.”). 
72. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160–61.  But see id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
declarant’s intent is what counts.”). 
73. Id. at 1160–62. 
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In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of 
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be 
relevant.  Where no such primary purpose exists, the 
admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal 
rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.74 
Thus, starting with Bryant, a fairly clear rule began to emerge: Any 
interaction in which the objectively determined primary purpose is 
something other than developing facts for a criminal investigation is 
nontestimonial (that is, admissible) for Confrontation Clause purposes.75 
3. Williams v. Illinois 
The Supreme Court’s latest foray into the Confrontation Clause 
doctrine yielded a badly fractured 4–1–4 decision that raised more 
questions than it answered.76  Five Justices held that the Confrontation 
Clause does not bar an expert witness from testifying on the basis of a 
lab report prepared by another analyst who does not testify at trial.77  
The plurality of four advanced two reasons supporting that result.78  
First, the expert’s testimony was not admitted to prove the truth of the 
matters asserted in the lab report.79  Second, and of importance to this 
Article, the plurality adopted a modified version of the primary purpose 
test and explained that, because the forensic report did not have the 
primary purpose “of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in 
criminal conduct,” the report was nontestimonial.80  The other five 
 
74. Id. at 1155. 
75. We leave to the side for purposes of this Article Justice Sotomayor’s comment that 
the reliability of a given category of statements is “relevant” to the primary purpose 
determination.  Id. at 1155.  That line has drawn fire from Justice Scalia, see id. at 1174–75 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), applause from Justice Kennedy, see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. 
Ct. 2705, 2725 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and perplexity from commentators, see, e.g., 
Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1310–16 (2011); Jason Widdison, Michigan v. Bryant: The Ghost of 
Roberts and the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 230–33 (2011). 
76. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221.  The Harvard Law Review described the case this way: 
“The lack of either a majority opinion or a clear holding, in addition to the internal flaws of 
the various opinions, deeply muddles Confrontation Clause doctrine, leaving the [C]lause’s 
application to forensic evidence in question.”  Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 267.  
77. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228. 
78. Id. at 2235–42.  
79. Id. at 2235–41. 
80. Id. at 2242 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2243 (finding that the primary purpose of 
the report was “to catch a dangerous rapist . . . not to obtain evidence for use against 
[Williams], who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that time”). 
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Justices disagreed with the plurality’s new explication of the primary 
purpose test.81  Justice Thomas, writing for himself alone, criticized the 
old primary purpose test as impractical and the plurality’s new 
formulation of requiring a particular person to be under suspicion as 
divorced from the text of the Sixth Amendment.82  The four dissenters 
argued that whether the police have a suspect at the time a forensic 
report is conducted “makes not a whit of difference” for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause and advocated for the retention of the Davis 
formulation of primary purpose.83 
Thus, the primary purpose doctrine now has two different tests, each 
supported by four Justices.  The plurality’s test finds a statement 
“testimonial” if it has “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual of engaging in criminal conduct . . . .”84  The four dissenting 
Justices adhere to the prior Davis test requiring the statements to have a 
primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case.85  Justice 
Thomas prefers to abandon the primary purpose test entirely.86 
D. Foreseeability of Prosecution is Not the Test 
Given the vague explanation of “testimonial” in Crawford and the 
“muddled” primary purpose test in Williams,87 it is not surprising that 
some courts, practitioners, and police officers occasionally have 
conflated the primary purpose test with the foreseeability of criminal 
prosecution;88 that is, if criminal prosecution is “foreseeable,” then the 
interaction is “testimonial.”89  That analysis may be tempting—and it is 
the analysis Justice Scalia argued for in dissent in Bryant—but it is not 
the law.90  Davis could have announced foreseeability as the test—
 
81. Id. at 2264–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting); id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
82. Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).   
83. Id. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
84. Id. at 2242 (plurality opinion). 
85. Id. at 2273–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
87. Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 272. 
88. See, e.g., Schnapper–Casteras & Ellis, supra note 40, at 1195–96 (collecting post-
Davis cases that use the “reasonable foreseeability” formulation). 
89. See, e.g., id. 
90. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the right test is whether the speaker understood that his statement “may be used to invoke 
the coercive machinery of the State against the accused”).  That formulation has Professor 
Friedman’s endorsement as well.  See Richard D. Friedman, Who Said the Crawford 
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“whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would foresee that 
the statement would be available for use in a criminal prosecution”—but 
the Court did not do that.91 
The Davis test does not turn on the foreseeability of a criminal 
prosecution; instead, it turns on the primary purpose of the interaction.92  
No stretch of legal or grammatical imagination can make the two 
categories entirely symmetrical: If an officer has a primary purpose and 
two secondary purposes, all of them are foreseeable, but only one is 
primary.  The officer with the primary purpose of saving a shooting 
victim (or locating the perpetrator and perhaps stopping another crime) 
when he asks “What happened to you?” also knows, with a certainty 
well beyond mere foreseeability, that the answer will likely serve as 
evidence in a criminal prosecution.  The officer will preserve the answer 
by writing it down in his report for later use.  In the example, saving the 
victim is the primary purpose; obtaining the facts to identify a suspect, 
prepare for criminal prosecution, and potentially forestall a future crime 
is a secondary purpose; and writing a complete and accurate report is a 
third purpose.93  A “foreseeability” test would make the interaction 
“testimonial” every time, but the Davis primary purpose analysis would 
deem such an interaction nontestimonial because the primary purpose is 
to save the victim.94 
 
Revolution Would Be Easy?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2012, at 14, 19 (“In the long run, I believe 
that the [C]ourt will adopt a sound view of what is testimonial, based on the reasonable 
anticipation of a person in the position of the speaker . . . .”). 
91. See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (adopting the primary 
purpose test, not a foreseeability test).  If the Court had made foreseeability, rather than 
primary purpose, the rubric, contemporaneous 911 calls would be “testimonial” because 
reasonable people know that 911 calls are recorded and are often used in criminal 
prosecutions.  Of course, the Supreme Court in Davis did not provide such a result-oriented 
explanation for its holding, but such logic may have been a reason why the Court shied away 
from announcing the foreseeability test.   
 In fact, foreseeability has not worked particularly well even in the torts field from which 
it originated.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 29 (2010) (“A foreseeability test for negligence cases risks being misunderstood 
because of uncertainty about what must be foreseen, by whom, and at what time.”).  Almost 
anything remotely related may be considered “foreseeable.”  Id.; see generally Ryan B. 
Abbott, Treating the Health Care Crisis: Complementary and Alternative Medicine for ACA, 
14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 35, 90 (2012) (discussing the role of foreseeability in the 
torts field). 
92. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
93. On the problem of “multiple concurrent purposes,” see, e.g., Marc McAllister, 
Evading Confrontation: From One Amorphous Standard to Another, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
473, 500–03 (2012). 
94. Michael Cicchini proposes that “the term testimonial should be defined as all . . . 
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1. The Difference Between Foreseeability and Primary Purpose: 
Illustration in the Caselaw 
The Ninth Circuit’s post-Crawford Confrontation Clause decisions 
in prosecutions for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326 illustrate the distinction between foreseeability and primary 
purpose.95  In illegal reentry cases, the government must prove that the 
defendant-alien (1) was deported and (2) physically removed from the 
United States and (3) did not receive permission to return, but 
(4) nonetheless did return.96  The second and third elements—previous 
removal and lack of permission to return—are typically proved by 
introducing documents from the defendant’s Alien File, or “A-File.”97 
The court’s analysis in these cases supports two propositions we 
endorse in this Article.  First, the possibility of future prosecution is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to make an interaction testimonial; and 
second, the statistical likelihood of future prosecution among multiple 
possible outcomes is a significant factor in the primary purpose analysis. 
a. Certificate of Non-Existence of Record: Testimonial 
In reentry cases, the prosecution proves the defendant’s lack of 
permission to return by presenting a “certificate of non-existence of 
record” (CNR), which is an affidavit that states that a Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) official has reviewed all the applicable 
records and determined that the defendant has not received permission 
 
hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the identification of the 
defendant.”  Cicchini, supra note 75, at 1321 (emphasis omitted); see also Michael Cicchini & 
Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington: Defining “Testimonial,” 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 550 n.126 (2006).  Cicchini seems to have just defined 
relevance.  If evidence does not tend in any way to establish an element of the crime or the 
identification of the defendant, then the evidence simply is not relevant.  So Cicchini’s 
proposed rule is just a “no hearsay against criminal defendants” rule.  Such a rule might make 
sense if the Court were devising trial rules from scratch or attempting to emulate historical 
practice.  But Cicchini’s formulation does not seem useful for predicting the future course of 
cases in this area. 
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 
1159–67 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830–34 (9th Cir. 
2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 
(2009).   
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 
97. See News Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Begins Transfer 
of Historical A-Files to National Archives (Jun. 3, 2009), available 
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/A-files_3jun09.pdf. 
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to re-enter.98  Because an applicable hearsay rule permits such 
evidence,99 these certificates were, at least before Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, generally introduced through a testifying case agent who 
usually was not the particular DHS official who conducted the records 
review.100  But after Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, courts have 
uniformly held CNRs to be testimonial because they are only prepared 
for presentation at trial.101  That is, the primary, or indeed only, reason 
the search is carried out and the affidavit generated is to create evidence 
for trial.102  Thus, under the Supreme Court’s tests, the CNR is 
testimonial, and whoever performed the search must testify at the 
defendant’s criminal trial.103 
b. Warrant of Removal: Nontestimonial 
In an illegal reentry case, the prosecution proves the defendant’s 
previous removal by a document called a “warrant of removal,” which 
memorializes both the deportation order and the physical removal.104  
The different fates of CNRs and warrants of removal after Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming illustrate the distinction between primary purpose 
and foreseeability.  The warrant of removal is signed, at the time of 
physical deportation, by the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) Detention and Removal agent who physically 
witnesses the transportation of the alien across the border.105  That 
officer witnesses dozens of deportations every day,106 so the officer 
almost certainly lacks a specific memory of any particular alien, 
especially months or years later; therefore, to prove that this particular 
defendant was deported, the document itself must be admitted 
substantively, whether or not the officer who viewed the deportation 
 
98. See, e.g., Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1159–60.  
99. FED. R. EVID. 803(7) (providing a hearsay exception for an absence of information 
in a record kept in regular course of business). 
100. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 831. 
101. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1162. 
102. See id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. See id. at 1163; see also ICE Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) (stating that a primary mission of ICE 
is border enforcement and removal operations). 
106. See, e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2009) (noting that, in 2008, the number of 
removals was 358,886, or roughly 1,000 removals per day). 
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testifies at the illegal reentry trial.  If that agent is not a witness, then 
another agent, the custodian of the A-file, lays the foundation for 
admission, identifying the document and explaining how it was created 
and maintained in the file.107  This testimony poses no problem under the 
hearsay rules,108 but after Crawford, and especially after Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming, defendants have challenged the warrants of removal as 
violative of the Confrontation Clause.109 
The courts, however, have consistently held that warrants of removal 
are nontestimonial.110  In United States v. Orozco-Acosta, for example, 
the government introduced the warrant of removal through the 
testimony of the A-file custodian.111  The agent who had physically 
witnessed the removal and signed the form did not testify; instead, the 
A-file custodian explained what the form recorded, how it was created, 
and how it was maintained.112  The defendant objected, arguing that, 
under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, he had a right to confront the 
agent who personally witnessed his departure.113  The warrant of 
removal, he argued, was like the forensic lab report in Melendez-Diaz.114  
The Ninth Circuit emphatically rejected that argument: 
Melendez-Diaz . . . repeatedly emphasized that the certificates of 
analysis in that case were prepared solely for use at the 
defendant’s trial.  Unlike the certificates of analysis in Melendez-
Diaz, neither a warrant of removal’s sole purpose nor even its 
primary purpose is use at trial.  A warrant of removal must be 
prepared in every case resulting in a final order of removal . . . 
and nothing in the record or judicially noticeable suggests that 
more than a small fraction of these warrants ultimately are used 
in immigration prosecutions.115 
Other circuits have treated warrants of removal the same way.116 
 
107. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
108. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (public records). 
109. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1161. 
110. See infra note 116 and accompanying text (citing cases). 
111. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1160. 
112. Id. at 1160–61. 
113. Id. at 1161. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1163–64 (internal citations omitted). 
116. Id. (“The [warrant of removal’s] primary purpose is to memorialize the deportation, 
not to prove facts in a potential future criminal prosecution.” (citing United States v. Burgos, 
539 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Torres–Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, 613 (8th 
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Two elements of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis are important here.  
First is the stark rejection of the “foreseeability” test.117  The court 
acknowledges that Crawford used foreseeability language as one 
possible formulation of the definition of “testimonial.”118  But the Court 
in Crawford did not adopt that formulation as its definition and, in fact, 
explicitly declined to provide a definition.119  Then, in Davis, the Court 
did adopt a definition—the primary purpose test120—which is narrower 
and less inclusive than the foreseeability test.  The circuits have thus 
correctly rejected attempts to make foreseeability of prosecution, and 
use of the statement in that prosecution, the rubric for admissibility.  
The second important element is the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of 
statistics to inform the primary purpose analysis. 
E. The Use of Statistical Evidence to Inform the Primary Purpose 
Analysis 
Primary purpose certainly means more than mere foreseeability.  In 
Orozco-Acosta, the Ninth Circuit recognized that statistical evidence 
might shed light on whether prosecution is likely to occur—and whether 
prosecution may therefore be considered the primary purpose of the 
activity.121  The court dove into statistics: “To illustrate, we take judicial 
 
Cir. 2007) (“Warrants of deportation are produced under circumstances objectively indicating 
that their primary purpose is to maintain records concerning the movements of aliens and to 
ensure compliance with orders of deportation, not to prove facts for use in future criminal 
prosecutions.”).  Melendez-Diaz cannot be read to establish that the mere possibility that a 
warrant of removal—or, for that matter, any business or public record—could be used in a 
later criminal prosecution renders it testimonial under Crawford.  See United States v. 
Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2008) (“That a piece of evidence may become 
‘relevant to later criminal prosecution’ does not automatically place it within the ambit of 
‘testimonial.’ . . .  [Otherwise,] any piece of evidence which aids the prosecution would be 
testimonial and subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.”). 
117. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64. 
118. Id. at 1164. 
119. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
120. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
121. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64 (only very few warrants of removal are later 
used in criminal prosecutions).  Primary purpose might mean primacy in frequency or 
primacy in depth; that is, primacy in terms of quantity (frequency) or quality (depth).  
Orozco-Acosta, and this Article, suggest that primacy in frequency should be taken into 
account.  See id.  Perhaps quality should also be considered because interactions that lead to 
prosecutions may be more “impactful” on both the alien and U.S. resources, and in this 
regard, the ubiquity of plea bargaining may weigh in the analysis, at least to the extent that 
statements from interactions with a primarily criminal investigatory purpose may never have 
occasion to be used at a criminal trial in contravention of the Sixth Amendment.  However, 
such analysis regarding quality is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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notice of the fact that while nearly 281,000 aliens were removed from 
the United States pursuant to final orders of removal in 2006, just over 
17,000 federal prosecutions for immigration offenses were commenced 
during approximately the same time period.”122  Seventeen thousand out 
of two hundred eighty-one thousand yields a 6% chance that any 
particular warrant of removal will later end up as evidence in a criminal 
trial as opposed to simply being part of the civil process of removing a 
person from this country.  And of those 17,000 prosecutions, only 
approximately two-thirds, or around 12,000, were for reentry after 
deportation.123 
Orozco-Acosta provides a template for determining the primary 
purpose of an inquiry when dealing with an agency that serves functions 
other than, or in addition to, pure law enforcement and prosecution: 
What is the statistical likelihood of the various possible outcomes of the 
interaction?124  Foreseeability does not help because the outcomes are all 
foreseeable.  The question is which outcome is primary. 
As explored further below, Border Patrol field interviews are 
paradigmatic examples of this dynamic.  Agents who detain people in 
the desert ask the core question, “Where are you from?”  As they do so, 
the agents are always aware that the answers might end up being 
introduced against the interrogee and others in criminal prosecutions.125  
But to determine whether obtaining that statement for a criminal 
prosecution is the primary purpose of the interaction, courts should 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead by considering that criminal investigatory 
purpose in light of the other, and likely predominant, purposes that such 
questioning might serve in Border Patrol interactions, such as referring 
aliens caught crossing illegally to immigration authorities for removal 
proceedings. 
Removal proceedings do not implicate the Confrontation Clause 
because they are civil, not criminal.126  Orozco-Acosta and the other 
 
122. Id. at 1164 n.5 (citing 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 
106; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 225711, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 23–24 tbl.4.1 (2006)). 
123. See Immigration Enforcement, Criminal Statutes in DHS-Immigration Convictions, 
by Court, FY2004, TRACDHS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsoffcourt.html (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter DHS-Immigration Convictions, by Court, FY2004]. 
124. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64. 
125. See, e.g., id. at 1162. 
126. An alien would never have a Confrontation Clause claim in a deportation hearing 
itself because confrontation rights are criminal trial rights.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 50 (2004); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  An alien has, however, certain due process rights 
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circuit cases in accord with it either explicitly or implicitly conclude that 
creating evidence for civil deportation proceedings does not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause in a subsequent criminal trial.127  After all, as 
Orozco-Acosta explicitly held, because warrants of deportation are 
produced for (civil) deportation proceedings, they are not testimonial.128 
This Article builds on Orozco-Acosta, reviews additional data from 
the Border Patrol, and concludes that criminal prosecution is likely not 
the primary purpose of interactions between Border Patrol agents and 
persons they encounter in the desert near the border. 
III. MULTIFUNCTION AGENCIES AND RELATIVE LIKELIHOODS OF 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF FUTURE PROCEEDINGS 
Determining the primary purpose of an interaction is difficult even 
when limited to cases involving police officers responding to reported 
crimes.  Even in those situations, the purpose of a given interaction 
cannot easily be shoehorned into either “emergency response” or 
“collecting evidence for prosecution.”129  In this section, we add another 
level of complexity.  We ask the Davis question in a relatively uncharted 
but doctrinally revealing context: When a Border Patrol agent first 
encounters a person in a remote area near the border, the agent’s first 
questions may well include, “Who are you?”  “Where are you from?” 
and “Do you have permission to be in the United States?”  Are the 
person’s answers testimonial in nature? 
Border Patrol interactions provide a useful lens through which to 
consider the scope of modern Confrontation Clause doctrine because, 
while Border Patrol agents carry guns and make arrests, the Border 
Patrol has a principally civil function: immigration enforcement.130  Even 
when investigating past events (as opposed to responding to ongoing 
emergencies), the legal proceedings flowing from the agents’ 
 
at such a hearing.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the 
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); see U.S. 
CONST. amend. V.  
127. See, e.g., Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1164. 
128. Id. 
129. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are other situations, aside from 
ongoing emergencies, when statements are not procured for the primary purpose of collecting 
evidence for prosecution.  See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); supra text 
accompanying note 74. 
130. See ICE Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., www.ice.gov/about/overview 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2013); supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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investigations will likely be civil (deportation), not criminal.131  How 
much should this matter for Confrontation Clause purposes?  Is P-1 a 
“witness against” P-2 for purposes of the Clause if P-1 made a statement 
in response to the officer’s question when the most likely outcome of the 
interaction was to establish facts for use in a civil deportation 
proceeding?  Recall that primary purpose is determined objectively 
from both the officer’s and the declarant’s perspectives.132  What could 
be more objective than statistical likelihood?  If criminal prosecution is 
a theoretical possibility, but rarely occurs, how heavily should that weigh 
in the analysis?  How likely do criminal prosecutions have to be in 
practice, when compared with ubiquitous civil proceedings, to become 
the primary purpose of the interaction?  Does it matter if the particular 
agent has “an eye toward” criminal prosecution?133 
The Border Patrol is a useful heuristic for exploring the numerical 
aspect of “primacy.”  The Crawford analysis has always emphasized the 
“eye toward” prosecution, so we must ask at what point that “eye” 
becomes “prosecutorial.”134  We suggest that the answer comes, at least 
partially, from statistics. 
A. The Border Patrol: An Ideal Hermeneutic 
The Border Patrol presents an ideal framework for predicting the 
future course of the Court’s Confrontation Clause doctrine for several 
reasons.  First, the type of statements elicited from interrogees by agents 
is narrowly circumscribed by context and training.135  Second, the 
answers will be potentially incriminating if the interrogee and his 
travelling companions are aliens without permission to be in the United 
States.136  Third, asking the questions is a necessary prerequisite to the 
 
131. See Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64.  Recall that the Sixth Amendment applies 
to criminal proceedings, but not civil cases. 
132. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160–62; see supra text accompanying notes 58–59, 72. 
133. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004) (“Involvement of 
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique 
potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with 
which the Framers were keenly familiar.” (emphasis added)). 
134. Id.  Little has changed since Crawford, even if the plurality’s opinion in Williams 
further limits the primacy test to specific targeted individuals.  See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. 
Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012).  
135. Border Patrol Agents may briefly question people regarding their citizenship and 
immigration status.  See, e.g., 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 319 (2008). 
136. Illegal entry is a crime, as is reentry after deportation.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 
(2006).  Thus, potential use in a criminal prosecution inheres in virtually every interview.  
What makes the question intriguing is that, statistically speaking, very few illegal aliens are 
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exercise of the agents’ statutory authority.137  Fourth, the event (whether 
or not a true “emergency”) is ongoing.  Fifth, the agency’s mission is 
overwhelmingly civil, and it intersects only infrequently with criminal 
prosecution.138 
Every day, Border Patrol agents discover people who the agents 
reasonably suspect are aliens.139  Their suspicion usually is based on 
proximity to the border and attempts to evade immigration 
authorities.140  For example, people found hiding bushes in the desert a 
mile north of the U.S.–Mexico border along a known smuggling path are 
circumstantially likely to be aliens.141  People found at a U.S. highway 
checkpoint on a road heading north from the border are also 
circumstantially likely to be aliens.142  The Border Patrol agent then asks 
two questions of the suspected aliens: “What is your nationality?” and 
“Do you have legal permission to be in the United States?”143 
 
actually prosecuted for entry or reentry.  Obviously, in absolute numbers there are many such 
prosecutions, around 40%–50% of the total federal caseload.  DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., 
MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE 
RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 7, 94 (2013).  But compared to the number of actual 
apprehensions of illegal aliens by the Border Patrol, the number of prosecutions is small. 
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006). 
138. See United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1163–64 (2010); see also ICE 
Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Jan. 17, 
2013). 
139. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 139; supra notes 122–23 and accompanying 
text; see, e.g., Brady McCombs, A Day in the Desert, U. N. COLO., http://www.unco.edu/northe
rnvision/fall2012/border.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (noting 950–1600 apprehensions a day 
in Tucson alone). 
140. J. Alan Bock, Validity of Border Searches and Seizures by Customs Officers, 6 
A.L.R. FED. 317 (1971) (“[The] practice of illegal aliens to walk across border or of smugglers 
to backpack contraband over border in remote desert areas between border checkpoints is 
well known . . . .”). 
141. Id. 
142. Cf. United States v. Rocha–Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 477–79 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming 
finding of reasonable suspicion for a stop that occurred one-and-one-half miles from the 
border in an area known for alien smuggling). 
143. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2005), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); 
United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 Courts have uniformly held that these interactions constitute permissible Terry stops 
(rather than custodial arrests), and thus no Miranda warnings are required.  See Hudson, 210 
F.3d at 1190 (“Miranda only applies when an individual is subject to ‘custodial 
interrogation.’”).  The U.S. Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit a police officer from stopping and frisking a suspect in public without 
probable cause to arrest, as long as the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
person is committing or is about to commit a crime and has reasonable belief that the person 
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Assume the following scenario, which is common along the U.S. 
border with Mexico:144 A Border Patrol agent arrests two people in the 
desert.  From his observations, he thinks Person #1 is a guide and is 
leading Person #2.  He detains them both and asks them their names and 
nationalities.  Both admit they are from Mexico.  He brings them back 
to the station for processing.  P-1’s name produces no “hits” in the 
immigration database, so P-1 is voluntarily returned to Mexico that 
evening. 
But P-2’s name turns up on a coyote watch list.  P-2 is charged with 
alien smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324.145  Normally, in such cases, P-1 
would be kept as a material witness,146 but in this case P-1 has already 
returned to Mexico.  At P-2’s trial, the government seeks to prove P-1’s 
nationality by introducing his admissions through the Border Patrol 
agent who interviewed him.  P-2 objects under the Confrontation 
Clause.  What results? 
This occurs not infrequently in the Southwest border districts.147  As 
noted, ideally the government figures out whom it will prosecute for a 
§ 1324 violation and detains the smuggled aliens as material witnesses in 
those cases, either for live testimony or for pre-trial depositions as 
contemplated by the statute (and which courts have held fulfills the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirements).148  But the ideal does not always 
come to pass.149  Sometimes a material witness who is out on bond 
absconds;150 sometimes a defendant in custody for another crime is not 
 
may be armed and dangerous.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  The Court in Miranda v. 
Arizona held that a suspect under a custodial arrest must be informed of his right to consult 
with an attorney and his right to remain silent.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 
(1966). 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010). 
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006) (bringing in and harboring certain aliens). 
146. Caleb E. Mason, The Use of Immigration Status in Cross-Examination of Witnesses: 
Scope, Limits, Objections, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 549, 582 (2010) (“For example, in alien-
smuggling prosecutions under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, smuggled aliens are often held as material 
witnesses.”). 
147. See, e.g., Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1159. 
148. Mason, supra note 146, at 582–83 n.147 (“Notwithstanding any provision of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, the videotaped (or otherwise audiovisually preserved) deposition 
of a witness to a violation of [the statute] who has been deported or otherwise expelled from 
the United States, or is otherwise unable to testify, may be admitted into evidence . . . .” 
(alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2006))).  The alien must have been 
provided an opportunity for cross-examination under the statute.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d). 
149. Mason, supra note 146, at 583. 
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (Supp. V 2011) (permitting detention of material witnesses to 
secure trial testimony). 
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identified as a guide or coyote until after all the potential witnesses have 
been removed from the United States.151 
If, in the hypothetical above, P-1 answers that he and P-2 are aliens 
without legal permission to be in the United States, the Border Patrol 
agent keeps P-1 and P-2 in custody and processes them for 
deportation.152  The key question, then, should be: What is the ex ante 
likelihood that a given contact between a Border Patrol agent and a 
person reasonably suspected of illegal entry will result in the filing of a 
criminal charge?  Is building evidence for use in a criminal prosecution 
the primary purpose of that interaction?  Or is the agent more likely 
building evidence for civil deportation? 
1. Using Statistical Data on Apprehension Outcomes 
Bryant makes clear that an objective standard should be used in 
determining whether a questioner’s primary purpose is prosecutorial.153  
In a field where the goal is to determine an officer’s “intent,” such 
objectivity is refreshing.  And little is thought to be more objective than 
statistical data. 
To get a sense of how statistical data might inform a given case, we 
compared the number of Border Patrol apprehensions in the Southwest 
to the number of immigration prosecutions in the same region. 
In Fiscal Year 2008, according to government data, Border Patrol 
agents apprehended 724,000 people, and the government prosecuted 
68,000 cases.154  Around 85% of all those immigration prosecutions were 
Border Patrol referrals,155 meaning that there were approximately 57,800 
criminal cases that might require proof at trial of what was said in a field 
encounter, or just less than 8% of total apprehensions.156  Thus, in 2008, 
 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing material 
witness in an alien smuggling action who was removed from United States before trial). 
152. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006). 
153. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160–62 (2011).  
154. Some 48,000 of those were illegal entry cases.  Illegal Reentry Becomes Top 
Criminal Charge, TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2013); Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels in FY 2009, 
TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels].  
155. Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels, supra note 154 (noting an 84.8% 
referral rate in 2009); Surge in Immigration Prosecutions Continues, TRACIMMIGRATION, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/188/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Surge in 
Immigration Prosecutions Continues] (noting an 87% referral rate in 2008). 
156. The most recent figures suggest a criminal prosecution rate upwards of 20%.  
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a Border Patrol agent could reasonably expect that each encounter and 
arrest carried an 8% likelihood of a resulting a criminal prosecution.  
The national numbers are averages from highly variable individual 
regions.  Such variation stems not only from proximity to the border, 
length of the border, and the degree of border protection, but also from 
less appreciated causes such as charging policies, which vary significantly 
from region to region.  For example, some regions charge misdemeanor 
illegal entry in first-crossing cases, while others have a more lenient 
charging policy.157  And indeed the greatest policy variation—and thus 
potentially the broadest and the narrowest charging policies—may well 
be found in the regions with highest crossing volumes.158 
To further illustrate the point, every reentry case in the Southern 
District of California that occurred in October 2010 was coded.159  That 
District is a high-volume border district that stretches from the coast to 
the Arizona border and shares the border with two major Mexican cities 
(Tijuana and Mexicali) as well as including vast stretches of desert and 
mountain regions that are popular crossing routes.160  The data showed 
that 180 illegal reentry criminal cases were filed.161  Of those, 121 were 
 
MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 94.  These statistics show that numbers of criminal 
prosecutions are on the rise vis-à-vis numbers of apprehensions.  At some point, as the 
percentage of prosecutions continues to rise, encounters between aliens and Border Patrol 
agents will take on a primary purpose of criminal investigation.  Has that tipping point 
already been reached at the 20% level?  Certainly, we are edging ever closer.  
157. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 97 (describing the rigid charging policies 
involved in certain regions that are not present in other regions).   
158. Border districts differ greatly in prosecution strategies.  One obvious example is 
“Operation Streamline,” in which as many apprehended aliens as possible are charged with 
misdemeanor § 1325 illegal entry.  See Southwest Border Security Operations, NATIONAL 
IMMIGRATION FORUM 1, 8 (2010), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Southw
estBorderSecurityOperations.pdf.  Arizona and Texas have experimented with this program, 
but it is difficult to administer because of sheer numbers.  Id.  Moreover, the procedural 
shortcuts—for example, mass meetings with a single attorney, mass plea colloquies, 
immediate mass sentencing—may present due process problems that other districts do not 
want to risk.   The Southern District of California, for example, has never adopted 
streamlining policies, which no doubt accounts for its lower prosecution likelihood.  Id. at 1. 
159. Primary data on file with co-author Caleb Mason.  Each case was coded for the 
following categories: district, case number, case name, filing date, agency, encounter type, 
whether statements were elicited, the number of aliens encountered, the location of the 
encounter, and a miscellaneous box for other comments.  The initial charge in these cases was 
illegal reentry because this region generally does not file criminal charges for a first entry 
absent some unusual circumstances. 
160. Federal Judicial Districts, California, FEDSTATS (Jan. 17, 2013), 
www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/fjd/06fjd.html. 
161. Primary data on file with co-author Caleb Mason. 
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Border Patrol desert cases in which an agent would have had an 
interaction with the alien and would ask questions such as, “Where are 
you from?”162  
In determining the likelihood of a criminal prosecution, we must 
divide the number of Border Patrol cases by the total number of Border 
Patrol apprehensions in that region during the same time period.  Thus, 
the numerator is 121.  Border Patrol agents in the two sectors in the 
Southern District (San Diego Sector and El Centro Sector) 
apprehended 6543 individuals in October 2010, making the denominator 
6543.163  So out of 6543 Border Patrol apprehensions, there were 121 
criminal prosecutions.164  That means that only 1.8% of apprehensions 
resulted in criminal cases. 
The Southern District of California sample thus indicates that a 
reasonable Border Patrol agent there would have a subjective 
expectation that only 1.8% of apprehensions would result in criminal 
charges.  To perhaps put the matter more starkly, a reasonable agent 
would have a 98.2% certainty that, for any particular arrest, there would 
be no criminal charges. 
And, as we look backwards, the likelihood of prosecution decreases 
significantly.  In the past three years, prosecutions have generally been 
up while apprehensions have been dropping,165 making the likelihood of 
criminal prosecution higher today than ever before (or, conversely, the 
likelihood of prosecution lower in the past than it is today).166  In 1996, 
for example, apprehensions numbered 1.6 million, and total immigration 
prosecutions numbered a mere 8000.167  And the 85% referral rate from 
 
162. The rest were ICE jail sweeps, referrals from local law enforcement, or port-of-
entry apprehensions.  The data suggests that, as a rule of thumb, at least for the Southern 
District of California, we can look at the number of reported immigration prosecutions and 
take two-thirds of that as the number of cases originating with the Border Patrol.  Primary 
data on file with co-author Caleb Mason. 
163. Primary data on file with co-author Caleb Mason.  In fact, 2010 was a low year for 
apprehensions nationwide—the lowest in decades—down from highs of almost 1.7 million 
earlier in the decade.  MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 3. 
164. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
165. Decline  in  Federal  Criminal  Immigration  Prosecution,  TRAC  IMMIGRATION, 
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283/; see also Julia Preston, Arizona 
Border Quiets after Gains in Security, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2013, at A1 (noting a 78% decline 
in apprehensions along the Arizona border from 2005 to present).   
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
167. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED 
STATES BORDER PATROL: NATIONWIDE ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS FISCAL YEARS 
1925–2011 (2011) (documenting nearly 1.6 million apprehensions in 1996); DHS-Immigration 
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2008 likely cannot be used because the Border Patrol in 1996 was less 
than one-half its 2008 size.168  But even assuming that the 85% rate could 
apply, that would generate 6800 prosecutions from 1.6 million 
apprehensions.169  The result is just four tenths of one percent.  In other 
words, for any given arrest, the Border Patrol agent in 1996 would have 
had a reasonable belief that there was a 99.6% chance that criminal 
charges would not be filed.  How, in such circumstances, could 
questioning reasonably be held to have been done “with an eye toward 
[criminal prosecution]”?170 
So, in short, depending on the temporal and geographical breadth of 
the framing analysis, the statistics show a range of less than 1% to as 
much as 20%, as a reasonable ex ante expectation of the likelihood that 
a given apprehension will result in a criminal prosecution.171  The highest 
percentage the statistics currently permit is 20%, unless a particular 
district has a higher prosecution rate.  In such a district, obviously, 
defendants would have a stronger claim that statements elicited from 
the putative aliens were testimonial. 
Assuming for the moment that the 20% figure is aberrant (the result 
of having high numbers of prosecutions as holdovers from previous 
charging policies while having low numbers of apprehensions as Border 
Patrol activities have been scaled back), and taking the 2008 figure of 
just slightly less than 8%, can one reasonably conclude that an outcome 
with only an 8% likelihood is the primary purpose of a particular 
interaction?  A gut-level reaction is no, particularly given that 
substantially more than 8% of the apprehensions will result in civil 
deportation.  Perhaps the answer to the same question for the 20% 
figure is yes.172 
 
Convictions, by Court, FY2004, supra note 123 (documenting approximately 8,000 criminal 
prosecutions in 1996). 
168. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED 
STATES BORDER PATROL: BORDER PATROL AGENT STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (2011) 
(noting that from 1996 to 2008 the number of Border Patrol agents increased from 5942 to 
17,499). 
169. Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels, supra note 154 (noting an 84.8% 
referral rate in 2009); Surge in Immigration Prosecutions Continues, supra note 155 (noting an 
87% referral rate in 2008).  To determine the 6800 prosecutions, we took 85% (referral rate) 
of the 8000 total prosecutions. 
170. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
171. See supra note 156 for further information regarding the 20% figure. 
172. The ability of the framework in this Article to adapt to these new and changing 
circumstances supplies even more reason to adopt this flexible approach that is rooted in 
objective fact. 
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Other factors may complicate the analysis: For example, is there 
another obvious possible primary purpose candidate?  Are there other 
contexts in which courts have treated an unlikely eventuality as the 
“primary” purpose of government action?173  And most immediately, for 
litigation, what should be done about the disparity between the national 
and regional figures?  Further, what level of generality should be used? 
Which numbers should courts use?  A good case can be made that 
the best numbers will be those from the district itself, and not national 
numbers.  Numbers from, for example, the Southern District of Texas 
are not intuitively relevant to the Southern District of California—or to 
a northern border state like North Dakota—especially given that the 
Southern District of Texas has adopted the streamline program and the 
Southern District of California has refused to do so.174  On the other 
hand, one could argue that, at least to the extent Border Patrol training 
is uniform and the apprehension methodology taught and practiced by 
agents is independent of the prosecution strategies developed by U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, the national numbers could be used.  A court might 
also consider it relevant whether agents in the field were aware of the 
local U.S. Attorney’s Office’s charging policies.  Knowledge of charging 
policies might change the result of the primary purpose inquiry. 
And, of course, the whole debate would be merely academic if a 
court held that even the highest estimate of relative likelihood—
20%175—is, as a matter of law, too low to count as “primary.”  A court 
might well hold that, given that there is another and more predominant 
purpose, namely, civil deportation, these interactions are not initiated 
for the primary purpose of securing evidence in a criminal prosecution—
even if criminal prosecution results in 20% of the interactions.  The 
Border Patrol’s primary mission is to keep aliens from getting in—not 
necessarily to prosecute them criminally afterwards.176  The key doctrinal 
point is that the Court’s Confrontation Clause test focuses on “primary” 
 
173. This Article does not mean to suggest that qualitative analysis should not be 
considered in the primary purpose analysis, only that quantitative analysis should 
substantially inform the inquiry.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
174. Lauren Gambino, Program Prosecutes Illegal Immigrants Before Deporting Them, 
ASU NEWS21, http://asu.news21.com/2010/prosecuting%20-illegal-immigrants/ (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2013); see also supra note 158 and accompanying text (regarding Operation 
Streamline). 
175. See, e.g., supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
176. See About CBP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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purpose, not “one among several coexisting purposes.”177 
No one would claim that Border Patrol agents are unaware of the 
possibility of prosecution.  But foreseeability is simply not the Supreme 
Court’s test.178  An 8% likelihood of prosecution cannot be the 
“primary” or predominant outcome.  A 20% likelihood moves 
substantially closer to the “primary” mark. 
2. Intake Policies 
Finally, much will depend on the nature of the district’s 
apprehension and, as noted above, intake guidelines.  For example, in 
an unpublished post-Crawford decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed a 
port-of-entry smuggling case and held that the agent’s interaction with 
the smuggled alien, after the arrest of the smuggler, was testimonial 
because of the local U.S. Attorney’s charging policies.179  Thus, at the 
driver’s trial the agent could not present the statement from the 
smuggled alien that he was from Mexico.180  Such testimony violated the 
Confrontation Clause because criminal prosecution was likely.181 
The court explained: 
We conclude that the witness’s statement that he was a citizen of 
Mexico, made during an interrogation being conducted as part of 
the investigation immediately following Solorio’s arrest, was 
testimonial.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 
2266, 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (holding that statements in 
response to police interrogation are testimonial “when the 
circumstances [surrounding their giving] objectively indicate that 
there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the investigation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution”).182 
This analysis is probably right, assuming that the interview of the 
smuggled alien occurred after a reasonable agent would have 
determined that the smuggling case met the district’s intake guidelines.183  
 
177. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
178. Id.; see supra note 90 and accompanying text (regarding the differences between 
foreseeability and primary purpose). 
179. United States v. Solorio–Gonzalez, 188 Fed. Appx. 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2006). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. (alteration in original) (omissions in original) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006)). 
183. The fact of arrest is not sufficient because Border Patrol may arrest aliens for civil 
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If the case had been, for example, a run-of-the-mill trunk case with one 
or two occupants, then the outcome should change, since these cases are 
rarely prosecuted as the statistics explored above readily show.  In the 
usual scenario, reasonable agents will know that the trunk case does not 
meet intake guidelines and thus will not be prosecuted.  Therefore, in 
the usual scenario, the Solorio-Gonzalez reasoning for finding a 
statement testimonial because of the strong likelihood of prosecution 
should not apply. 
Indeed, in the Miranda context, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
custodial questioning on immigration status and nationality by 
immigration agents is categorically not “interrogation” where the 
purpose of the questioning is referral for civil deportation.184  By 
contrast, where a prosecutorial purpose can be inferred, custodial 
questioning is “interrogation” for Miranda purposes.185 
The Miranda test, of course, with respect to its definition of 
“interrogation,” sweeps much more broadly than the Confrontation 
Clause test with respect to its definition of “testimonial.”  The Miranda 
test asks whether incrimination is “reasonably likely” to result from the 
custodial interview.186  But in answering that question, courts do examine 
“purpose” evidence, which would certainly bear on the Confrontation 
Clause analysis as well.187  For example, the Ninth Circuit analyzed one 
Miranda challenge as follows: 
The responses elicited from Gonzalez–Sandoval by the [B]order 
[P]atrol agents were used to help prove the charges of illegal 
entry and being a deported alien found in the United States.  
Agent Vasquez had reason to suspect that Gonzalez–Sandoval 
was in this country illegally and the questions he posed were 
“reasonably likely” to elicit responses which would substantiate 
the charge that Gonzalez–Sandoval had violated 8 U.S.C. § 
 
immigration infractions.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006) (vesting Border Patrol agents with 
authority “to arrest any alien . . . entering or attempting to enter the United States in 
violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of [immigration] law”). 
184. United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002). 
185. United States v. Gonzalez–Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 1990). 
186. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301–02 (1980).  Of course, Miranda is also 
narrower than the Confrontation Clause in that it applies only to “custodial” interrogation, 
while the Confrontation Clause has no such limit.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 
(1966).  
187. Innis, 446 U.S at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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1326.188 
Query what answer might result on the same fact pattern in a 
Confrontation Clause challenge.  Given the statistics for prosecution, it 
would seem that the fact the agent had “reason to suspect” criminal 
activity would not suffice to make the statement testimonial,189 even 
though it did suffice to render the interaction “interrogation” for 
Miranda purposes.  Indeed, the case illustrates the difference between 
the two doctrines.190  Miranda is an objective test about the likely 
prosecutorial utility of the information disclosed191 (and about whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to 
leave, an inquiry not implicated here), while the Confrontation Clause 
test, even as refracted through the objective “reasonable observer” lens 
of the Bryant analysis, is about the primary purpose of the 
conversation.192  The likelihood of an outcome is not commensurate with 
its primary purpose.193 
Thus, a reasonable Border Patrol agent who knows the local intake 
policies may find good reason to tread lightly for both Miranda and 
Confrontation Clause purposes (at least insofar as the agent cares about 
the admissibility of statements made by the person whom he is 
questioning).  On the Miranda side, the bar for interrogation is rather 
low—whether incrimination is reasonably likely; on the Confrontation 
Clause side, a case that meets a region’s intake policies is well on its way 
to criminal prosecution, thereby potentially tripping the primary 
purpose trigger. 
B. Wider Applications 
In sum, our proposal regarding the primary purpose test for 
Confrontation Clause analysis builds on two of the principal holdings 
from Supreme Court precedent: First, that classification of a 
government agent’s primary purpose is a practical, fact-intensive 
inquiry;194 and second, that there are numerous possible government-
 
188. Gonzalez–Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1047. 
189. Id. 
190. That is, there will be situations in which a statement taken from a witness will be 
suppressed as against that witness per Miranda, but will be admissible against third parties per 
Davis and Bryant. 
191. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
192. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
193. See id. 
194. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 (2011). 
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agent purposes for gathering information other than investigation in 
preparation for prosecution, and that if any of those alternative 
purposes is primary, then the statement is nontestimonial.195  We may 
now consider the statistical likelihood of prosecution, and speculate with 
some reasonable confidence about other applications of the primary 
purpose doctrine outside of police emergency response. 
1. Community Caretaking 
Statements made in “community caretaking” investigations have not 
been analyzed by any court as a distinct Confrontation Clause 
modality.196  Courts have long recognized community caretaking as 
conceptually distinct from emergencies and investigating past crimes.197 
Forty years ago, in Cady, the Supreme Court recognized the 
“community caretaking” function of police: 
Some [police–citizen] contacts will occur because the officer may 
believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many 
more will not be of that nature. Local police officers . . . 
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim 
of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, 
may be described as community caretaking functions, totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.198 
Bryant opens up space for the government to argue that statements 
taken by police in their caretaking function are like those taken in their 
emergency response function—that is, not investigative and thus not 
testimonial.  It does not appear that any case has yet so held.199  Indeed, 
there are more than 1200 state cases discussing the community 
caretaking function, but only three of them in the same paragraph as 
“testimonial”—and those are all pre-Davis.200  
 
195. Id. at 1155. 
196. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
197. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
198. Id. (emphasis added). 
199. An AllFeds in a WestLaw Classic search returned zero results for (caretaking & 
testimonial & Bryant), indicating that no federal court has had yet analyzed the caretaking 
function in light of Bryant.  WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) 
(subscription required).  An AllStates search yielded one result, but the court was not citing 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause case.  Thus, no court appears to have 
confronted this issue.  Id. 
200. And all are from Massachusetts.  Commonwealth v. Tang, 845 N.E.2d 407, 412 
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2. Drunk Driving Checkpoints 
Another example is the drunk-driving checkpoint.  In 1990, the 
Supreme Court held that a State’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the lack of 
particularized suspicion for the stops.201  The Court’s reasoning with 
respect to the Fourth Amendment may prove instructive regarding the 
statistical analysis proposed in this Article for determining whether an 
interaction is “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment. 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there is a drunk-driving epidemic in the United States, 
and that, annually, 25,000 people die because of alcohol-related 
accidents.202  At the particular checkpoint involved in that case, 126 
vehicles entered the checkpoint, and only two drivers were arrested.203  
That is, about 1.6% of the drivers were arrested.204  For purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, this small number of arrests compared to stops 
suggests that the primary purpose of the roadblock was not to arrest 
drivers for a later criminal prosecution for drunk driving, but to prevent 
drunk driving in the first place.205  Indeed, that is what the Court found 
with respect to the Fourth Amendment case: The State had a strong 
interest in “preventing drunken driving,”206 not just in arresting people 
who were driving drunk. 
3. General Crime Control: New York City Stop-and-Frisk Interactions 
New York City’s “stop-and-frisk” interactions provide another 
example.  Suppose an NYPD officer stops and frisks a young man—
something that happens around seven hundred thousand times a year in 
New York City.207  The officer grabs young Billy, pushes him up against 
the wall, and pats him down.  While doing so, he asks: “Do you have any 
weapons?”  Billy says, “No, but I just saw Johnny hiding a gun under 
 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
201. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
202. Id. at 451. 
203. Id. at 454. 
204. Id. at 455. 
205. Moreover, even if the motivation was to catch drunk drivers, primary purpose is 
determined objectively (not subjectively), and, this Article suggests, that determination 
should be informed, at least in part, by statistical evidence of likelihood of outcome.  The very 
low likelihood of arrest belies a primary purpose of criminal investigation. 
206. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
207. Stop and Frisk Data, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
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that trash can when you came walking up.”  Johnny, it turns out, is a 
suspect in a murder case.  The District Attorney (DA) had a weak 
circumstantial case against Johnny, but has a better one once the officer 
recovers the gun and a crime lab matches it to the murder weapon.  
However, the DA still has no forensic evidence linking the gun to 
Johnny, so the statement from Billy during the stop-and-frisk becomes a 
crucial link in the evidentiary chain at trial.  But Billy disappears before 
Johnny’s trial.  May the government have the officer testify to Billy’s 
statement?  The testimony may fit within Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(1), present sense impression, or some other exception; if so, there is 
no hearsay problem.208  But does Billy’s statement nonetheless run afoul 
of the Confrontation Clause? 
The court must look at the primary purpose of the interaction 
between the officer and Billy.209  Was it the development of facts for 
criminal prosecution?  Does it matter if it was for development of facts 
for a criminal prosecution in general or the criminal prosecution of 
Johnny in particular?210  Or was the stop-and-frisk for something entirely 
different from criminal prosecution?  As it turns out, the NYPD has had 
in place, for more than two decades, a policy of widespread stop-and-
frisk policing that, statistically, appears to have very little relationship to 
the prosecution of crimes.211 
According to the most recent data, collected by the NYPD itself, of 
the approximately 685,000 people stopped and frisked in 2011 in New 
York, only 12% were arrested or issued summonses.212  That percentage 
has been steady for the full ten-year period for which the department 
has data.213  And those data are citywide.  Some precincts had even lower 
percentages.214  For example, in the Bushwick precinct in Brooklyn, for 
 
208. The rationale underlying the present sense impression exception is the unlikelihood 
of fabrication; however, when a police officer grabs a person and frisks him, that person may 
be trying to deceive the officer. 
209. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  We also have to know whether the 
Williams plurality’s new test for primary purpose becomes the law.  In this scenario, Johnny is 
a murder suspect, but he is not the target murder suspect for the particular gun about which 
Billy told the officer.  Under at least the plurality’s test, Billy’s statement does not seem to be 
testimonial even if the purpose of the interaction was to obtain evidence for a future criminal 
prosecution of someone. 
210. The plurality in Williams indicates the latter, but only four Justices have adopted 
that new test.  Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2238 (2012). 
211. Stop and Frisk Data, supra note 207. 
212. Id. 
213. See id. 
214. RAYMOND W. KELLY, NYC POLICE DEP’T STOP QUESTION & FRISK ACTIVITY: 
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the calendar year 2006, only 2% of stop-and-frisks resulted in arrests 
and 4% in summonses; thus, for a given stop-and-frisk encounter in 
Bushwick, there was an ex ante 94% likelihood that the encounter would 
not lead to any criminal proceedings.215 
As with Border Patrol stops, one has to ask: Does it make sense to 
label as primary an outcome that happens approximately 10% of the 
time?  If the New York City program were new and experimental, it 
might make more sense to treat primary purpose differently because 
statistics on criminal prosecutions would be unknown.  But the New 
York City program is twenty years old and has been dramatically 
expanded over the past decade.  From 2001 to 2011, the total number of 
stop-and-frisks has risen from around 97,000 to 686,000.216  This program 
can be conceptualized not as criminal investigation, but rather as a 
“public safety” program,217 with the measure of success being guns seized 
rather than criminal prosecutions initiated.218 
And considering the perspective of the reasonable person stopped 
and frisked, as Bryant requires, may also lead to an interpretation of the 
interaction that is not primarily focused on collecting evidence for 
prosecution.  As a number of commentators have pointed out, young 
black men in high-stop-and-frisk neighborhoods perceive stops-and-
frisks as a show of force, a brute demonstration of who is in charge, not 
 
REPORTS PREPARED DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2006, at 2 
(2006). 
215. Id. 
216. Stop and Frisk Data, supra note 207.  The yearly totals are as follows: 2002: 97,000; 
2003: 161,000; 2004: 314,000; 2005: 398,000; 2006: 506,000; 2007: 472,000; 2008: 540,000; 2009: 
581,000; 2010: 601,000; 2011: 685,000.  Id. 
217. See Caleb Mason, The Police-Prosecutor Relationship and the No-Contact Rule: 
Conflicting Incentives After Montejo v. Louisiana and Maryland v. Shatzer, 58 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 747, 770–71 (2010). 
218. That is, if the goal is simply to seize guns rather than to convict defendants, then the 
actual stop-and-frisk practices make more sense.  See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Success of 
Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at A1. 
Some street crimes officers also said they felt pressured by the department’s 
emphasis on crime statistics, and that they are forced to adhere to an unwritten 
quota system that demands that each officer seize at least one gun a month.  “There 
are guys who are willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his hands in his pockets,” 
said an officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.  “We frisk 20, maybe 30 
people a day.  Are they all by the book?  Of course not; it’s safer and easier to just 
toss people.  And if it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun yet?  
Things can get a little desperate.” 
Id. 
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as a method of gaining evidence for prosecution.219  That interpretation 
of the interaction—while not one the government is likely to publicly 
endorse—is certainly not “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events 
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”220  Indeed, part of 
the complaint is precisely that the police engaged in stop-and-frisk 
patrols are not particularly focused on investigating crime.221 
So for political reasons among others, the government might not 
want to make the argument that stop-and-frisk interactions are 
nontestimonial on the grounds that criminal prosecution is such an 
unlikely eventuality.  But the argument is there to be made, and the 
statistics amply support it. 
4. Other Potential Applications 
Nor has the existing case law addressed the general methodological 
question about applying the primary purpose analysis to any of the big 
multifunction agencies.  The framework suggested in this Article may be 
applied outside Border Patrol contexts to other agencies’ interactions as 
well.  For example, Central Intelligence Agency interrogations later 
introduced as evidence against third parties; statements taken by 
“intelligence” units within the Federal Bureau of Investigation that do 
not generally refer cases for prosecution; statements taken by military 
personnel, especially in places in which the military has worked closely 
with both intelligence services and U.S. law enforcement, and where 
some in-country detainees have ultimately been charged and tried in the 
United States;222 statements taken by officers of various regulatory 
agencies (such as EPA, FDA, SEC, and DEA) while the agents are 
serving a regulatory function; school security encounters with students; 
 
219. Tovah Renee Calderon, Race-Based Policing from Terry to Wardlow: Steps Down 
the Totalitarian Path, 44 HOW. L.J. 73, 79–80 (2000) (discussing the racially discriminatory use 
of the stop-and-frisk and its perception by the black community in New York City); see also 
Joseph Goldstein, A Focus on 3 Encounters in a Stop-and-Frisk Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
2013, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/nyregion/focus-on-3-
encounters-as-trial-begins-on-stop-and-frisk-tactic.html (discussing a class action lawsuit 
regarding the NYPD’s policy of “stopping hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of black 
and Hispanic men and boys in the street”). 
220. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
221. See Stop and Frisk Facts, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/node/1598 (last visited Jan. 
11, 2013). 
222. Foreign Cooperative Investigations, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/fci.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).  Most obviously 
Afghanistan, but also Latin America, where DEA overseas “rapid response” paramilitary 
task-forces work closely with local governments.  Id. 
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Transportation Security Administration airport encounters; the list goes 
on and on. 
Or, for a chilling example, assume the 24223-type example: Jack Bauer 
has two terrorist suspects in custody.  There is a ticking time bomb in 
New York City.  Jack beats one of the suspects until he confesses that 
the two suspects did plant a bomb, and he tells the agents where they 
hid the bomb.  The agents deactivate the bomb and save the City.  The 
suspect who confessed dies, and in the prosecution of the surviving 
suspect, the agents testify about the co-conspirator’s statements.  Does 
this violate the Confrontation Clause?224  Does it matter if Jack would 
testify that he questioned the suspects to save the City, not to acquire 
evidence for their eventual criminal prosecution (although he certainly 
was aware of the possibility)?  In none of these areas has any 
Confrontation Clause case law yet developed.  But this Article suggests 
a fruitful framework for analyzing these and other cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What factors make a statement “testimonial” for Confrontation 
Clause purposes?  What factors should courts examine to determine 
when criminal prosecution is the primary purpose of a potential 
defendant’s interactions with an agent?  In Bryant, the Court recognized 
that government agents serve a variety of missions, many of which are 
not aimed primarily at obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution.  
Bryant further teaches that the proper inquiry is a pragmatic assessment 
of the actual practices, policies, and working conditions of the 
government agents at issue, viewed from an objective standpoint. 
Williams, which had been expected to clarify matters, unfortunately 
added a layer of complexity by unsettling the definition of primary 
purpose.  But the muddling of what it means for a statement to have a 
particular primary purpose only underscores the need for a clearer test, 
such as the one proposed by this Article. 
Determining whether an interaction has the primary purpose of 
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution should include statistical 
analysis of the probability of future prosecution among the possible 
outcomes of a particular class of interactions performed by agencies that 
 
223. 24 (Imagine Entertainment, 20th Century Fox Television, 2000–2010).  This 
hypothetical is not taken from the show, but is of the type that might have been presented on 
it. 
224. There may be an evidentiary issue as well.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
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serve multiple functions, not all of which are prosecutorial.  With such 
data, courts can attempt, in reasonably predictable and objective ways, 
to squeeze the square peg of multipurpose agencies into the round hole 
of the primary purpose test. 
